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DO NOT REPRINT OR REPRODUCE WITHOUT PERMISSION.1. Some theoretical arguments assume monetary non-neutrality even in the long run. For example, Tobin (1965)
introduces outside money into his economic growth model to show that inflation, induced by the central bank’s
excess supply of outside money, raises the capital-labor ratio. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) employ a two-country
version of the dynamic equilibrium model to show that short-term changes in the money supply influence production
and consumption in the long run through fluctuations in trade imbalances.
2. The simple regression of output by the money stock is known as the St. Louis equation.
3. See the Appendix for a summary of Lucas (1972). See Okina (1986) for an overview of empirical research in Japan
regarding the relationship between the money stock and real output.
I. Introduction
This paper comprehensively investigates long-run monetary neutrality in Japan, with
due consideration to the order of integration of the money stock and real output,
mainly using long-term time-series data retroactively available from the Meiji Period
(1868–1912).
The issue of whether or not changes in the money stock influence real variables, such
as real output and the unemployment rate, has long been a major topic in monetary
economics. If changes in the money stock and changes in real variables are independent,
then money is deemed to be neutral, and if not then money is non-neutral. Specifically,
long-run monetary neutrality is said to exist if a permanent increase or decrease in the
nominal money stock does not have any long-term effect on the level of output.
The independence between real and nominal variables in the long run is a widely
accepted notion in economic theory, the so-called classical dichotomy. In theoretical
analyses of long-term consequences in the economy, including economic growth,
long-run monetary neutrality is generally assumed.
1 In empirical analyses of business
cycles, long-run monetary neutrality is often employed as an identifying restriction in
the structural vector autoregression (VAR) model, proposed by Blanchard and Quah
(1989). Thus, it is deemed important to reexamine the empirical validity of long-run
monetary neutrality, based on actually observed data.
Empirical examinations to confirm long-run monetary neutrality have been con-
ducted for many years. During the 1960s, many adopted the method of regressing
output by the money stock.
2 In response to these efforts, Lucas (1972, 1973) and
Sargent (1971, 1976) pointed out the problems with investigating the long-run 
neutrality of nominal variables using reduced-form models. Lucas employs a simple
rational expectations macroeconomic model to demonstrate that analyses using
reduced-form models lead to the erroneous conclusion that long-run monetary 
neutrality does not exist, even in cases where it does.
3
The critique offered by Lucas and Sargent is closely related to the stationarity of
data. To verify long-run monetary neutrality, changes in the money stock are required 
to contain a permanent component that is independent from any changes in output.
If the money stock does not contain a unit root, it does not include any permanent
changes, and therefore its long-run neutrality cannot be verified.
Yet the presence of a unit root in the money stock is also not sufficient. For 
example, when a central bank takes an endogenous policy response, changes in the
money stock are not independent from real output. This is because in such cases 
simply looking at the reduced-form information does not enable us to examine the
long-term effects of “pure” variations in the money stock. To verify long-run neutrality, 
it is essential to identify shocks that are independent from changes in output.
80 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 20044. Some studies focus on types of long-run neutrality other than monetary neutrality, such as the Fisher effect and
the slope of the long-run Phillips curve. For example, Koustas and Serletis (1999) examine the Fisher effect, and
King and Watson (1994) examine whether or not the long-run Phillips curve is vertical. 
5. Weber (1994) uses data across the G-7 nations. Bullard and Keating (1995) use data for the 58 countries where
readily available data exist. Serletis and Krause (1996) and Serletis and Koustas (1998) use data for nine countries:
Australia, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
6. However, in addition to Weber (1994), long-run monetary neutrality is also rejected in some cases employing 
different definitions of the money stock: Olekalns (1996) for Australia since 1900; Coe and Nason (2003) for
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States; Jefferson (1997) for measures of both inside
money and outside money; and Serletis and Koustas (2001) for broadly defined monetary aggregates. 
7. Yamada (1997) shows that monetary neutrality holds in terms of real output, by applying Fisher and Seater’s
(1993) procedure to the Japanese quarterly data from 1957/I to 1995/I.
Among these points of dispute regarding the testing procedures, Fisher and Seater
(1993) further explore the empirical issues regarding the time-series properties of 
the data. They demonstrate that the preconditions for testing long-run monetary
neutrality can be established not by using the money stock alone, but rather based on
the order of integration of both the money stock and real output.
On the basis of the argument in Fisher and Seater (1993), King and Watson (1997)
address the empirical issues for identification of shocks. They employ a structural 
VAR model with a priori restrictions to identify exogenous shocks, thereby enabling
verification of long-run monetary neutrality with a reduced-form model. They then
examine the robustness of empirical evidence on long-run neutrality by testing a wide
range of identifying restrictions.
In response to King and Watson (1997), the direction of research on long-run
monetary neutrality has moved to verifying the robustness of empirical evidence
using a diverse range of data.
4 The extension of data has been carried out mainly in
two ways: the extension of time series retroactive to the period before World War II,
and various alternative definitions of the money stock. Moreover, advanced proce-
dures of unit root testing with structural breaks are also applied to reexamining
empirical evidence in previous studies.
More specifically, research on further explicating long-run monetary neutrality
includes the studies below. On the one hand, Weber (1994), Bullard and Keating
(1995), Serletis and Krause (1996), and Serletis and Koustas (1998) use cross-
country data.
5 Among these, Weber (1994) and Bullard and Keating (1995) both 
use quarterly data for the period after World War II. On the other hand, Serletis 
and Krause (1996) and Serletis and Koustas (1998) employ long-term time-series
data that include the prewar period. These studies reveal that long-run monetary
neutrality generally holds for wide-ranging periods and countries.
6 Serletis and
Koustas (1998), however, conclude that long-run neutrality cannot be tested in
Japan, because their unit root tests with a structural break show that the monetary
aggregates do not include unit roots.
In spite of the progress in research on long-run monetary neutrality, only a very
limited number of comprehensive studies are available in Japan.
7 Given that highly
accurate Japanese data are readily available from the Meiji Period, it is possible to test
monetary neutrality in Japan by using long-term time-series data that include various
definitions of monetary aggregates. As noted in Weber (1994), longer observation
periods are deemed more desirable in testing long-run monetary neutrality, since 
they include more information on long-run fluctuations. Moreover, considering the
81
On Long-Run Monetary Neutrality in Japanlimited power of the unit root test and the important role of the order of integration
of the data in verifying long-run monetary neutrality, it is important to apply the
more sophisticated procedures of unit root testing to reexamine the time-series 
property of the data. In this paper, we therefore comprehensively investigate long-run
monetary neutrality in Japan, with attention to the order of integration of the 
variables, mostly by using long-term time-series data retroactively available from the
Meiji Period.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a summary of empirical
frameworks for testing long-run monetary neutrality. Section III explains long-term
annual data for monetary aggregates and real output. Section IV examines the 
time-series properties of the annual data by carrying out unit root and cointegration
tests. Section V presents empirical findings on long-run monetary neutrality using
long-term annual data in Japan. Section VI reports the estimation results for the
postwar quarterly data to supplement the empirical evidence using the long-term
annual data. Section VII summarizes our empirical findings and concludes the paper.
II. Outline of Analytical Methods
In this section, we first review the relationship between long-run monetary neutrality
and the order of integration of the money stock and real output. We then move on to
explaining the methodology for verifying long-run monetary neutrality by identifying
exogenous monetary shocks. 
A. Order of Integration and Long-Run Monetary Neutrality
Fisher and Seater (1993) formulate tests for long-run neutrality in relation to the
order of integration, based on the reduced-form model below.
a(L) 
<m>mt = b(L) 
<y>yt + ut,
(1) d(L) 
<y>yt = c(L) 
<m>mt + wt.
Here, y and m are respectively the natural logarithms of output and the money 
stock, while u and w are the error terms in the equations, <x> denotes the order of
integration of a variable x,   is a difference operator, and a(L), b(L), c(L), and d(L)
are lag polynomials. The terms a0 and d 0 are scaled to one, and the error terms u and
w are i.i.d. with zero mean.
The long-run derivative of output with respect to the money stock, LRDy,m, is
defined as the equation below:
 yt+k/ ut LRDy,m ≡ lim——— —. (2)
k→∞  mt+k/ ut
Long-run monetary neutrality holds when LRDy,m is equal to zero. Based on this 
formulation of LRDy,m, Fisher and Seater (1993) relate tests for long-run neutrality to
the order of integration. 
82 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004First, when the order of integration of the money stock is zero (<m> = 0), the
shock ut does not have any permanent effect on the money stock. The denominator
of LRDy,m thus becomes zero (limk→∞ mt+k/ ut = 0), and long-run neutrality cannot 
be tested.
8
Next, when the order of integration of the money stock is one or higher, three
cases are possible. The first case is when the order of integration of the money stock
is higher than that of real output. This case always supports long-run monetary neu-
trality, because a shock to the money stock does not have any permanent influence
on real output, and the numerator of equation (2) becomes zero (limk→∞ yt+k/ ut = 0).
The second case is when the order of integration of the money stock is equal to that
of real output, and they are both one or higher. This case requires the identification
of shocks to the money stock, which are independent from changes in real output.
Under this case, therefore, one cannot judge whether long-run monetary neutrality
holds just from the order of integration. The third case is when the order of integra-
tion of the money stock is less than that of real output. This case supports long-run
monetary neutrality, if shocks to the money stock do not influence the growth rate of
real output. 
In the meantime, monetary superneutrality holds when changes in the growth
rate of the money stock do not have any long-term effects on real output, that is to
say, when LRDy, m is equal to zero. In this case, the conditions for testing monetary
superneutrality are obtained by replacing the money stock with the money stock
growth in the aforementioned four cases for long-run monetary neutrality. In other
words, the order of integration of the money stock growth and real output must be
equal, and must be one or higher (and thus the order of integration of the money
stock must be at least two).
B. Identifying Monetary Shocks
As explained in the previous subsection, exogenous shocks
9 to the money stock must
be identified to test long-run monetary neutrality when the orders of integration of 
the money stock and real output are the same and both one or higher. King and 
Watson (1997) propose an empirical framework to identify shocks with a broad range
of identifying restrictions, thereby checking the robustness of long-run monetary 
neutrality. Following King and Watson (1997), we explain the method of identifying
shocks below.
When the orders of integration of the money supply and real output are both one,
the bivariate reduced-form model is described by a vector moving average, expressed
as the sum of two exogenous shocks (structural shocks) of the monetary shock ( t
m)
and the non-monetary shock ( t
 ), as shown in equation (3). 
 yt =  y (L) t
  +  ym(L) t
m,
(3)  mt =  m (L) t
  +  mm(L) t
m.
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8. Fisher and Seater (1993) call the data “uninformative” concerning long-run monetary neutrality when the money
stock is a stationary process and does not include the information required for testing long-run monetary neutrality.
9. Shocks to the money stock are independent from the fluctuations of real output. These shocks cannot be directly
observed due to various factors including endogenous monetary policy responses. t
m,  t
  are unrelated, and both i.i.d. Here, the constant terms are omitted to simplify
the explanation.
The long-term effects of the monetary shock on output and on the money stock
can be expressed, respectively, as   ym,j t
m ≡  ym(1) t
m and   mm,j t
m ≡  mm(1) t
m. In this
case,   ym =  ym(1)/ mm(1) expresses the long-term elasticity of output to monetary
shock. Corresponding to LRDy,m in the previous subsection, long-run monetary 
neutrality holds when  ym = 0.
Assuming that all characteristic roots for the coefficient matrix of equation (3) lie
outside the unit circle, equation (3) can be inverted to yield a VAR of equation (4)
below. This requires that the money stock and real output both have a unit root but
are not cointegrated.
p                                    p
 y0 yt =  ym mt +  j,yy yt−j +  j,ym mt−j + t
 ,
j =1                                j=1
p                                    p
(4)
 m0 mt =  my yt +  j,my yt−j +  j,mm mt−j +  t
m.
j =1                               j =1
Based on the specification of equation (4), the long-term elasticity of output to 
monetary shock  ym and that of the money stock to output shock  my are defined as
equation (5) below: 
pp
 ym =  j,ym/(1−   j,yy),
j =1 j =1
(5)
pp
 my =  j,my/(1−   j,mm).
j =1 j=1
The bivariate structural VAR of order p, as in equation (4), has 2
2 × (p + 1)
unknowns in the coefficients and 3 (=2 ×(2 +1)/2) unknowns in the covariance matrix
of the residual. Meanwhile, the bivariate reduced-form VAR of order p provides 
estimates of 2
2p parameter values for the coefficients and three values for the covariance
matrix of the reduced disturbance. 
Accordingly, 2
2 = 4 identifying restrictions must be placed to identify the structural
shocks  t
m and  t
 . Standardizing  y0 and  m0 to unity and using the assumption that the
structural shocks are mutually uncorrelated, in other words, that the diagonal elements
of the covariance matrix are zero, the number ofa priori restrictions is reduced to one.
King and Watson (1997) adopt two types of a priori restrictions: short-term and
long-term restrictions. First, the short-term restriction specifies a contemporaneous
relationship between endogenous variables and shocks by imposing restrictions on 
the short-term elasticity, such as  ym = 0 or  my = 0. The former restriction indicates
short-run neutrality whereby output does not react contemporaneously to the shock 
to the money stock. In contrast, the latter restriction indicates the situation whereby
84 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004the money stock does not contemporaneously accommodate changes in output, and
output becomes the predetermined variable. 
Second, the long-term restriction specifies a long-term relationship between
endogenous variables and shocks by imposing restrictions on the long-term elasticity,
for example,  my = 0. This is equivalent to the situation whereby the money stock
does not accommodate shocks to output and therefore the general price level remains
unchanged (assuming constant velocity of money). Additionally, long-run neutrality
( ym= 0) is applicable as an identifying restriction. 
In the sections below, we first explain the data and estimation periods and then
examine the preconditions for testing long-run neutrality based on the order of 
integration of each variable, as explained in the previous subsection. In this process,
we conduct unit root tests with a structural break of recent years, and determine the
order of integration. We then test long-run monetary neutrality by employing the
procedure in identifying monetary shocks explained above. 
III. Data
As for the time-series data for the money stock and real output in Japan, we compile
a data set with the longest time series currently available, covering 119 years 
from 1885 through 2003. We use three types of the money stock: cash currency in
circulation (hereafter denoted as CASH), M1, and M2. Given the limitations of the
prewar period data, we use the time series for the amounts outstanding at the end
of each year. 
Fujino (1994) is a well-known source for Japan’s long-term time-series data for
the money stock.
10 The data in Fujino (1994) are consistent with the money stock
data currently compiled by the Bank of Japan, retroactively available from 1955, and
are thus directly linkable. Fujino (1994) does not provide any estimates for the
period from 1941 through 1951, but Asakura and Nishiyama (1974) do. Utilizing
these two data sets, we compiled three time series for the money stock: CASH, M1,
and M2. Specifically, we utilized the series presented in Fujino (1994) for the periods
1885–1940 and 1952–54, the series presented in Asakura and Nishiyama (1974) for
the 11 years from 1941 through 1951,
11 and connected these with the Bank of Japan’s
money stock statistics since 1955.
12
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10. Fujino (1994) estimates the prewar money stock (CASH, M1, and M2) statistics based on the Banking Bureau
Annual published by the former Ministry of Finance. Fujino states that the Banking Bureau Annual “has a very
high level of accuracy overall, and is not only exceptionally accurate compared with other Japanese economic 
statistics but peerless compared with banking statistics from other nations worldwide.” 
11. Asakura and Nishiyama (1974) do not adjust the data for financial institutions’ cash on hand or for deposits
between financial institutions, and all of their series take larger values than those in Fujino (1994). However, the
ratio between the two differs significantly before and after World War II. Accordingly, we make a linear interpo-
lation between the prewar and postwar ratios, apply this to reduce the figures in Asakura and Nishiyama (1974)
so that they become consistent with those in Fujino (1994), and then use them to interpolate the missing 
observations during World War II. We should be cautious in that the reliability of the data source during the
period from 1941 to 1950 is not that high. Fujino (1994) chooses to set the year 1951 as the initial period for his
retroactive estimation of postwar money stock data, considering the sparse availability of basic statistics during
and soon after World War II. 
12. For M2, the time series includes CDs from 1979.Next, the long-term output time series are sourced from Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and
Yamamoto (1974), who estimate real GNP from the Meiji Period forward. From
1955, these statistics are directly linkable to the real GNP series in the System of
National Accounts (SNA). In this paper, we prepare our output data using Ohkawa,
Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974) and the SNA data. For the period from 1885 
to 1954, we use the gross national output series from Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and
Yamamoto (1974). This is linked with the real GNP series in the SNA for the period
from 1955 to 2003. As for the SNA data, we use the previous 68SNA basis data for
the period from 1955 to 1979, and the current 93SNA basis data for the period after
1980, for which 93SNA basis retroactive data series are available. We thus compile a
data set for the money stock and real output covering the period from 1885 to 2003.
It should be noted, however, that the data from the two years 1943 and 1945 are
missing, and we make a linear interpolation for these missing observations. 
Our data sets should also prove useful from the perspective of supplementing 
the conclusions on long-run monetary neutrality in Serletis and Koustas (1998), who
utilize long-term international time-series data. 
Serletis and Koustas (1998) use the prewar international long-term time-series
data in Backus and Kehoe (1992) to test long-run monetary neutrality. They con-
clude that Japan’s money stock (M2) does not have a unit root when considering a
structural break, and that therefore they cannot test long-run monetary neutrality in
Japan.
13 Although the data set in Backus and Kehoe (1992) covers a wide range of
countries, there is room for some improvement, at least in the data for Japan.
14
Specifically, we think two points below are very important.
The first point is that M2 is the only measure of the money stock they consider.
Weber (1994), Olekalns (1996), Coe and Nason (2003), Jefferson (1997), and
Serletis and Koustas (2001), all of whom examined long-run monetary neutrality
focusing on the definition of the money stock using postwar data sets, report that
long-run monetary neutrality can sometimes be rejected when different types of
money stock data are adopted. For this reason, the use of money stock data aside
from M2 is considered important.
15
The second point is that the data for the period from 1941 to 1951 are missing
and that data after 1963 are not included in the sample. When time-series models are
used, the data should be continuous, and need to cover periods when important
events occurred, such as the sudden expansion of monetary aggregates during and
after World War II and the liberalization of financial markets since the 1980s. 
Considering these problems in the previous studies, we extend the coverage of 
the data set used in this paper. In addition to M2, we include CASH and M1 for 
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13. During the sample period, CDs were not issued.
14. The data set in Backus and Kehoe (1992) cover real GNP/GDP, general prices, and the money stock for 
10 nations (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the United States) prior to World War II. 
15. Weber (1994) examines long-run monetary neutrality using postwar quarterly data for the G-7 nations and
reports that unit root test results are sensitive to the definitions of the money stock. More precisely, he points out
that the narrowly defined money stock tends to be I(1), while the broadly defined money stock tends to be I(2).
As explained later, however, using the quarterly postwar data for the money stock in Japan, CASH, M1, and M2
are all generally judged to be I(1).the analyses. We also extend the data set up through 2003, and we interpolate the
missing observations from 1941 to 1951 for the period around World War II by
using an alternative data source.
IV. Preliminary Tests
In this section, we examine the time-series properties of the data with CASH, 
M1, and M2 as the money stock and real GNP as real output. We first conduct unit
root tests on the four series. We then conduct cointegration tests on the money stock 
and real output. As noted in Section II, to verify long-run monetary neutrality we
first need to show that the money stock and real output are both I(1) and that they
are not cointegrated.
A. Unit Root Tests
Table 1 presents the results of the conventional unit root tests. We calculate three
types of test statistics, the widely used augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
Perron (PP) tests as well as the weighted symmetric (WS) test.
16,17 The null hypothesis
that a unit root exists at the log transformed level cannot be rejected for all the 
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16. While the ADF and PP tests are both widely used, Maddala and Kim (1998) recommend using alternative testing
procedures because of their low power. Accordingly, in this paper we adopt the WS test, which provides improve-
ments over the ADF and PP tests, as discussed in Maddala and Kim (1998). Maddala and Kim (1998) state 
that for low-frequency data the PP test is more powerful than the ADF test, so the application of the PP test is 
considered significant for the annual long-term time-series data used in this paper.
17. Unit root tests are conducted based on the specifications with constant and linear trend terms. The lag orders for
the ADF and WS tests are decided, following Ng and Perron’s (1995) general-to-specific rule, by the procedure
of sequentially reducing the lag order from the maximum of 12 until the last term becomes statistically significant
at the 10 percent level. 
Table 1  Unit Root Tests (Sample Period: 1887–2003)
CASH M1 M2 Real GNP
[A] Level
ADF –2.076 (9) –2.216 (7) –2.154 (7) –1.912 (1)
PP –6.140 –5.315 –4.364 –4.755
WS 0.804 (12) 0.157 (8) 0.343 (5) –1.515 (1)
[B] First difference
ADF –3.290* (1) –2.838 (1) –2.411 (12) –4.052*** (6)
PP –46.151*** –56.260*** –82.683*** –86.338***
WS –2.850 (8) –3.004* (1) –2.598 (12) –4.213*** (6)
[C] Second difference
ADF –4.884*** (8) –5.969*** (4) –6.216*** (4) –5.176*** (10)
PP –147.207*** –162.129*** –154.648*** –115.029***
WS –5.041*** (8) –6.126*** (4) –6.377*** (4) –5.293*** (10)
Notes: 1. Constant and trend terms are included in both ADF and WS tests.
2. *** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
3. Figures in parentheses for ADF and WS tests show the lag order. The lag order is chosen 
by the general-to-specific rule: the lag order is iteratively reduced until the last coefficient
becomes significant within the maximum lag order of 12.variables in all the tests. However, when taking the first difference the null hypothesis
is rejected, except for the ADF test for M1 and the ADF and WS tests for M2.
Moreover, when taking the second difference the null hypothesis is rejected for all the
variables in all the tests. The results in Table 1 indicate that the order of integration
of both CASH and real GNP is one (hereafter I(1)), and that the order of integration
of M1 and M2 is either I(1) or I(2).
18,19 Because of this, as explained in Section II, 
if real output is I(1) and monetary aggregate series is I(2), then we need to test not
for monetary neutrality, but rather for superneutrality.
In the meantime, the movements of the time-series data plotted in Figure 1 
indicate that structural changes are likely to occur around the period of World 
War II. Perron (1989) points out that when we conduct unit root tests ignoring
potential structural changes in a deterministic trend, we are likely to judge that orders
of integration are higher than they really are.
For more rigorous testing, we also apply the testing procedure in Perron (1997)
for unit root tests with structural change.
20 More specifically, we test for unit roots
against two alternative hypotheses regarding the stationary process: one incorporates
a level shift only, and the other incorporates both a level shift and a trend break.
21
We see from Table 2 that when considering a possible structural break real GNP is
still judged as I(1), while CASH and M2 are either I(1) or I(2) and M2 is I(2).
22
In the meantime, Serletis and Koustas (1998) conclude that M2 in Japan is I(0),
and thus long-run monetary neutrality cannot be tested, by using data ranging from
1885 to 1962, but with missing observations for the World War II period of 1941 to
1951. However, we see from the lower panel of Table 2 that when we use data for the
same period but interpolate the World War II period observations real GNP is
judged as I(1) and M2 as I(2), while CASH and M1 are likely to be I(0). 
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18. Following the proposal in Maddala and Kim (1998), we conduct our confirmatory analysis using stationarity as
null to examine the robustness of our conclusions about unit roots, based on KPSS tests (Kwiatkowski et al.
[1992]) for level stationarity or trend stationarity. All the log-transformed series for CASH, M1, M2, and real
GNP reject the null hypothesis of level stationarity or trend stationarity at the 1 percent level, confirming that
they are I(1) or higher. All the first differenced series do not reject the null of level stationarity at the 10 percent
level. The first difference of real GNP does not reject the null of trend stationarity at the 10 percent level, and
that of CASH and M1 does not at the 1 percent level, while that of M2 rejects the null of trend stationarity at
the 1 percent level. Thus, the possibility that M2 is I(2) remains.
19. The results for unit root tests are robust against the effects of recent data under zero nominal short-term interest
rates. To check this point, we conduct the same unit root tests by excluding data after 1995, and gain results that
are qualitatively the same as the results for full sample estimations. 
20. Perron (1997), which is employed in this paper, extends the testing procedure in Perron (1989) by endogenously
selecting structural break points from the data, and computing asymptotic distributions for finite samples.
Christiano (1992) points out the bias in test statistics when a structural break point is given exogenously. 
In response, Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1992) propose unit root testing
procedures of endogenously selecting a structural break point from the data. In the meantime, Soejima (1995)
examines the unit root testing procedures with a structural break using Japanese data. 
21. A level shift and a trend break imply that a structural beak occurs in the constant term and the slope of a linear
trend, respectively.
22. Of course, the structural break point is not necessarily restricted only once during the period around World 
War II. As examined extensively in Soejima (1995), it is highly likely that a structural change occurs at the 
first oil crisis in the money stock and real output. We leave the issues of endogenously determining the number
and timing of structural changes for future research, given that this line of research on unit root testing proce-
dures is currently advancing. See, for example, Lee and Strazicich (2003) for unit root testing procedures with
two structural changes.89
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Note: Data are compiled as follows.
•For monetary aggregate figures, the present money stock statistics are
used from 1955 forward. Prior to 1955, we utilized the estimates in Fujino
(1994), which are consistent with the present time series. For the period
1941–51, which is missing from the data in Fujino (1994), we use the
data in Asakura and Nishiyama (1974). Finally, for the years 1943 and
1945, which are missing from Asakura and Nishiyama (1974), we use 
a linear extrapolation.
•For real GNP, we use the present series from 1955 forward. The data
prior to 1955 are sourced from Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto
(1974).
Sources: Asakura and Nishiyama (1974); Fujino (1994); Ohkawa, Takamatsu,
and Yamamoto (1974); Bank of Japan, “Financial and Economic
Statistics Monthly”; Cabinet Office, “National Accounts.”90 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004
Table 2  Unit Root Tests with a Structural Change
[1] Full Sample Period (1887–2003)
CASH M1 M2 Real GNP
[A] Level
Model-1 2.587 (11) –3.941 (2) –4.358 (8) –4.468 (8)
[1947] [1935] [1943] [1944]
Model-2 2.593 (9) –0.534 (8) –0.843 (8) –1.123 (12)
[1947] [1948] [1947] [1957]
[B] First difference
Model-1 –3.178 (8) –2.185 (2) –1.801 (6) –8.547*** (6)
[1941] [1948] [1949] [1944]
Model-2 –5.297** (8) –4.861 (7) –5.342** (7) –5.601** (11)
[1941] [1943] [1943] [1957]
[C] Second difference
Model-1 –5.720*** (9) –5.710*** (7) –6.377*** (9) –5.288** (11)
[1946] [1947] [1947] [1969]
Model-2 –4.802 (9) –5.309** (5) –5.832** (5) –10.588*** (7)
[1948] [1946] [1946] [1944]
[2] Subsample Period (1887–1962)
CASH M1 M2 Real GNP
[A] Level
Model-1 –2.347 (9) –2.292 (2) –1.807 (2) –0.543 (1)
[1941] [1935] [1936] [1932]
Model-2 –5.877*** (11) –5.181* (11) –4.234 (11) –2.641 (1)
[1936] [1940] [1940] [1936]
[B] First difference
Model-1 –3.826 (11) –4.265 (11) –4.080 (1) –3.477 (6)
[1941] [1943] [1935] [1932]
Model-2 –5.277** (11) –4.033 (7) –4.253 (1) –9.416*** (11)
[1942] [1941] [1937] [1943]
[C] Second difference
Model-1 –13.451*** (0) –4.634 (5) –4.779* (5) –8.779*** (11)
[1917] [1930] [1931] [1944]
Model-2 –4.152 (9) –4.331 (9) –4.469 (9) –4.655 (7)
[1937] [1943] [1943] [1936]
Notes: 1. “Model-1” and “Model-2” test the null hypothesis   = 1 by
Model-1: xt =   +  DUt +  t + D(Tb)t +  xt–1 +  
k
i=1 xt–i + et,
Model-2: xt =   +  DUt +  t + DTt +  D(Tb)t +  xt–1 +  
k
i=1 xt–i + et,
where t is the time trend and e is the error term. Here, the value of DUt is zero before 
the structural change and one thereafter; the value of D(Tb) is one at the period after the 
structural change and zero at all other times; and the value of DT t is zero before the 
structural change, and then becomes the dummy variable t.
2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively,
based on Perron (1997).
3. Dates inside brackets show the time points when the structural change occurs. These time
points are selected to maximize the absolute value of t, the structural change parameter.
4. Figures in parentheses show the lag order. The lag order is chosen by the general-to-
specific rule: the lag order is iteratively shortened until the last coefficient becomes 
significant within the maximum lag order of 12.The above results for unit root tests with a structural change suggest that test
results for long-term time series of the money stock in Japan are sensitive to the han-
dling of missing observations for the World War II period. It should be noted that
such a structural change, if any, influences the data generation process gradually over
a decade. This makes it difficult to detect the influence of a structural change when
supplementary data are used to fill in the missing observations. In contrast, if we
exclude the missing observations and simply concatenate observations for the prewar
and postwar periods, then a large gap emerges in the time-series movement of the
data and the influence from the structural change seems to be overly identified. 
B. Cointegration Tests
As explained in Section II, long-run monetary neutrality cannot be tested when the
money stock and real output are cointegrated. We next test for cointegration between
real GNP and CASH, M1, and M2, respectively. 
Table 3 presents the results of the Engle-Granger test for cointegration between
real GNP and CASH, M1, and M2. This table indicates that the null hypothesis that
there is no cointegration between the money stock and real GNP cannot be rejected
even at the 10 percent level for all three measures of the money stock, CASH, M1,
and M2.
We further conduct the cointegration test of Gregory and Hansen (1996) that
gives rigorous consideration to structural changes. This residual basis test considers
three types of structural shift: (1) level shift; (2) level shift with a trend; and 
(3) regime change (level shift combined with change of the cointegration vector). 
Table 4 summarizes the results of cointegration tests with a structural change 
for the full sample period. On the whole, these test results reverse the results of 
the Engle-Granger test without considering a structural change. These tests show
cointegration between real GNP and both CASH and M1 for all three types of 
structural changes. In the case of level shift and trend shift, however, the probability
of cointegration with M1 is somewhat lower. As for M2, the results indicate that
cointegration exists under the regime change case, but does not exist under the two
other cases.
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Table 3  Cointegration Tests
CASH M1 M2
Full sample –2.047   (1) –1.904   (1) –1.814   (1) (1887–2003)
Notes: 1. We conduct the ADF test on the regression results for real GNP on the constant term and
the money variables (the Engle-Granger test). The table does not include any results that 
are significant at the 10 percent level or less.
2. Figures in parentheses show the lag order. The lag order is chosen by the general-to-
specific rule: the lag order is iteratively shortened until the last coefficient becomes 
significant within the maximum lag order of 12.C. Summary of Time-Series Properties of the Data
To sum up the results of the unit root and cointegration tests, it is difficult to draw 
definite conclusions on the time-series properties of the data. The test results differ
depending on the testing procedures, especially whether or not consideration is given
to a structural change. Although not ideal, it is deemed highly probable that the 
combination of M2 and real GNP satisfies the preconditions for testing long-run 
monetary neutrality: they are both I(1) and are not cointegrated. It should be noted,
however, that the possibility that M2 is I(2) cannot be denied, so we also test long-run
monetary superneutrality for M2.
In the analysis below, we mainly examine long-run monetary neutrality in M2,
and employ CASH and M1 in a supplementary manner to check the robustness of
the benchmark estimation results for M2. 
V. Estimation Results
We now follow the method used in King and Watson (1997), which is explained in
Section II, to test for long-run monetary neutrality based on the long-term Japanese
time-series data from 1885 to 2003. Specifically, we make four sets of calculations
using a bivariate (the money stock and real output) structural VAR model under the
four different identifying restrictions: (1) the short-term elasticity of the money stock
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Table 4  Cointegration Tests with a Structural Change (Sample Period: 1887–2003)
CASH M1 M2
[A] Level shift (C)
ADF * –6.700*** [1943] –5.288*** [1943] –3.530 [1929]
Zt* –6.713*** [1943] –5.195*** [1943] –4.024 [1940]
Z * –65.509*** [1943] –43.063** [1943] –27.440 [1939]
[B] Level shift and trend break (C/T)
ADF * –6.224*** [1943] –5.162*** [1943] –3.855 [1962]
Zt* –6.182*** [1943] –5.044** [1943] –4.159 [1942]
Z * –57.394*** [1943] –40.790** [1943] –29.068 [1942]
[C] Regime change (C/S)
ADF * –6.698*** [1943] –6.323*** [1944] –7.014*** [1944]
Zt* –6.712*** [1943] –6.325*** [1944] –7.044*** [1944]
Z * –65.408*** [1943] –61.027*** [1944] –70.176*** [1944]
Notes: 1. Using the methods presented in Gregory and Hansen (1996), we conduct residual-basis
cointegration tests on level shift (C), level shift with trend break (C/T), and regime change
(C/S), respectively, under the following specifications.
(C)  x1t =  1 +  2Dt +  x2t + et.
(C/T)  x1t =  1 +  2Dt +  t +  x2t + et.
(C/S)  x1t =  1 +  2Dt +  1x2t +  1x2tDt + et.
Here, Dt has a value of zero before the structural change, and then becomes the dummy 
variable t.
2. Dates inside brackets show the time points when the structural change occurs.
3. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.to real output ( my) is known; (2) the elasticity of real output to the money stock ( ym)
is known; (3) the long-term elasticity of the money stock to real output ( my) is known;
and (4) the long-term elasticity of real output to the money stock ( ym) is known.
As noted above, our subsequent empirical investigation focuses on M2, which most
satisfies the preconditions of the time-series properties for testing long-run monetary
neutrality. Considering the restrictions of the lag order, we set the beginning of the 
sample period as 1890 and use data prior to the initial period as lags in regressions. 
A. Benchmark Estimation Results for M2
Figure 2 presents the benchmark estimation results for M2 using the sample period
from 1890 to 2003 with a lag order of two. In this estimation, we add a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one after 1941.
First, panels [1] through [3] show the estimates of  ym (the black lines) and their 
95 percent confidence interval (the gray lines) for the elasticities of  my,  ym, and  my
as the identifying restrictions ranging from –2 to 3, respectively. In these panels, 
if  ym = 0 (the horizontal line at the value of zero) is included in the 95 percent 
confidence interval, then long-run monetary neutrality cannot be rejected at the 
5 percent significance level. For example, in panel [1] when  my = 0, the estimate 
of  ym is 0.112 and the 95 percent confidence interval is −0.072 ≤  ym ≤ 0.296, so
long-run monetary neutrality is not rejected.
Panels [1]–[3] as a whole show that long-run monetary neutrality holds for a wide
range of identifying restrictions. The point estimates of  ym are respectively a decreas-
ing function in  my, an increasing function in  ym, and a decreasing function in  my.
The point estimates of  ym take a value of zero around the identifying restrictions 
of  my = 0.6,  ym =− 0.4, and  my = 1.45, respectively. As for the results of testing 
for long-term monetary neutrality,  ym = 0 stays within the 95 percent confidence
interval for the identifying restrictions of  my ≥− 0.4, −2 ≤  ym ≤ 3, and  my >− 1.6,
respectively, and the long-run monetary neutrality hypothesis is not rejected.
23
Closer examinations of panels [1]–[3] give the observations below. Looking first
at panel [1], as noted by King and Watson (1997), the value of  my depends on the
supply process of the money stock. When a central bank provides reserves to
smooth interest rates, m is adjusted to accommodate money demand shocks resulting
from changes in y. Therefore,  my corresponds to the short-term elasticity of money
demand, and  my is expected to take a positive value.
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23. The estimation results using identification restrictions outside the values shown in panels [1]–[3] in Figure 2 
generally support long-run monetary neutrality. First, using  my as the identifying restriction (panel [1]),  ym = 0
comes back to the confidence interval when  my ≤− 2.65, and, thus, long-run monetary neutrality turns out not
to be rejected. The power of the test, however, becomes weak when  my ≤− 3.2 or  my ≥ 5.5, since the confidence
interval becomes wider than two. Second, using  ym as the identifying restriction (panel [2]),  ym = 0 always stays
within the confidence interval regardless of the value of  ym, thus long-run monetary neutrality is not rejected
under any values of the identifying restriction. Nevertheless, the power of the test becomes weak when  ym
≤− 1.55 or  ym≥ 2.25, since the confidence interval becomes broader than two. Third, using  my as the identifying
restriction (panel [3]),  ym = 0 returns within the confidence interval when  my ≤− 6.85, and thus long-run 
monetary neutrality turns out not to be rejected. However, the confidential interval becomes broader than two
when  my ≥ 3.75, and thus the testing power becomes weak.94 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004
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[4] 95 Percent Confidence Ellipse of  my and  ym When  ym = 0
Note: Black lines in panels [1]–[3] and “×” in panel [4] are estimated values. Gray lines
indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals.Panel [2] shows that long-run monetary neutrality holds even when short-run
monetary neutrality does not, implying that short-run non-neutrality is deemed 
consistent with long-run neutrality. Standard macroeconomic models assume that an
expansion in monetary aggregates, at least over the short term, does not reduce real
output. This corresponds to the case of  ym ≥ 0, and even under this assumption
long-run monetary neutrality is not rejected.
In panel [3],  my is a parameter that indicates the long-term reaction of m to the
exogenous and permanent shock to y. If the velocity of money is constant, then price
levels also remain constant when  my = 1. Given the downward trend in the velocity
of M2 and the upward trend in general price levels, the value of  my is likely to be
greater than one. Even under such assumptions for  my, long-run monetary neutrality
is still not rejected. 
In reverse to panels [1]–[3], panel [4] in Figure 2 employs long-run monetary 
neutrality ( ym = 0) as an identifying restriction and plots the 95 percent confidence
ellipse for the short-term elasticities of  my and ym. When the identifying restriction of
 ym= 0 is used, the point estimates of ( my, ym) are (0.607, –0.378) and the 95 percent
confidence ellipse includes the origin and slopes downward to the right. Here, it should
be noted that the upper and lower bounds of the value of  ym are somewhat broader
than those of  my.
B. Robustness of the Estimation Results for M2
Next, we check the robustness of the estimation results shown above by changing 
the lag order and estimating without the postwar dummy variable. The results are
summarized in Table 5. The upper panel presents the estimation results for  ym
using the three identifying restrictions  my = 0,  ym = 0, and  my = 1, respectively.
Conversely, the lower panel presents the estimation results for  my,  ym, and  my using
the identifying restriction  ym = 0. The table also shows the estimation results for 
lag orders of three and four in addition to the lag order of two in the benchmark 
estimation.
24 Moreover, the table provides the estimates with and without a constant
dummy that takes a value of one from 1941 on.
We see from Table 5 that the results generally support long-run monetary 
neutrality, except for certain cases. We see a tendency of expanding the standard error
as the lag order increases. We confirm that the inclusion or non-inclusion of a 
postwar dummy variable does not influence the test results on long-run monetary
neutrality.
We next examine the robustness of the period for setting the postwar dummy
variable in detail. We estimate  ym by sequentially shifting the beginning period of the
postwar dummy variable from 1941 to 1951, using identifying restrictions  my = 0,
 ym = 0, and  my = 1, respectively (estimations corresponding to Table 5 [1]). The
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24. The lag order could also be selected based on the information criteria. However, the lag order selection may have
a major impact on the estimation results since we focus on the long term, in the sense that the period is long
enough to materialize all the effects. As pointed out by Faust and Leeper (1997), the lag order itself should also
be considered as a restriction when using long-term identifying restrictions. For these reasons, we employ the
more conservative approach of examining the robustness by computing for each lag order.results are presented in Figure 3, which shows the point estimates as a circle and their
95 percent confidence intervals as vertical lines. We see from the figure that long-run
monetary neutrality is not rejected in most cases under the identifying restrictions 
 my = 0,  ym = 0, or  my = 1.
To examine the effects of including data under the recent zero interest rates, we
estimate  ym by sequentially extending the end of the sample period from 1994 to
2003.
25 Figure 4 shows the point estimates of  ym as well as their confidence intervals,
as shown in Figure 3. We see from the figure that the point estimates of  ym are not so
sensitive to the inclusion of data for the period of zero interest rates, and long-run
monetary neutrality generally holds. Nevertheless, we should be a bit cautious in 
concluding that the data for the period of zero interest rates are unlikely to influence
the estimation results, when using long-term historical data. To address this point, 
we examine the effects of the data for the period of zero interest rates by using 
quarterly data in Section VI.
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Table 5  Long-Run Neutrality of M2: Robustness to Lag Length and Sample Period
[1] Estimates of  ym with Various Identifying Restrictions ( my = 0,  ym = 0, and  my = 1) 
Sample Dummy Lag Identifying restriction
period variable order  my = 0  ym = 0  my = 1
1890–2003 — 2 0.122 (0.089) 0.161 (0.155) –0.060 (0.107)
1890–2003 — 3 0.118 (0.090) 0.167 (0.171) –0.059 (0.090)
1890–2003 — 4 0.148 (0.109) 0.207 (0.240) –0.067 (0.117)
1890–2003 PW 2 0.112 (0.093) 0.154 (0.156) –0.043 (0.113)
1890–2003 PW 3 0.108 (0.095) 0.159 (0.173) –0.076 (0.094)
1890–2003 PW 4 0.141 (0.117) 0.203 (0.247) –0.087 (0.124)
[2] Estimates of  my,  ym, and  my with the Identifying Restriction of Long-Run Neutrality ( ym = 0) 
Sample Dummy Lag Identifying restriction:  ym = 0
period variable order  my  ym  my
1890–2003 — 2 0.689 (0.192) –0.411 (0.228) –1.576 (1.096)
1890–2003 — 3 0.664 (0.173) –0.545 (0.336) –0.145 (1.627)
1890–2003 — 4 0.733 (0.186) –0.587 (0.350) –0.105 (1.467)
1890–2003 PW 2 0.607 (0.183) –0.378 (0.226) –1.401 (1.101)
1890–2003 PW 3 0.564 (0.161) –0.488 (0.326) –0.402 (1.607)
1890–2003 PW 4 0.644 (0.174) –0.537 (0.342) –0.101 (1.437)
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are the standard errors.
2. Specifications with a dummy variable (PW) are estimated adding a constant dummy variable
that takes the value of one from 1941 on.
25. It is often pointed out that the money demand function becomes unstable under zero nominal interest rates. For
the details on this point, see Bank of Japan (2003), Nakashima and Saito (2002), Fujiki (2002), and Fujiki and
Watanabe (2004).97
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[3] 95 Percent Confidence Interval for  ym When  my = 1
Notes: 1. Horizontal axis indicates start of estimation sample period; all samples run
through 2003.
2. The “   ” in the figures indicates the estimated value of  ym, and the vertical
line shows the 95 percent confidence interval.98 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004
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[3] 95 Percent Confidence Interval for  ym When  my = 1
Notes: 1. Horizontal axis corresponds to the end of the sample period.
2. The “   ” in the figures indicates the estimated value of  ym, and the vertical
line shows the 95 percent confidence interval.C. Estimation Results for CASH and M1
Next, let us briefly review the estimation results for CASH and M1. Like Figure 2,
Figure 5 presents the estimates of  ym (the black line) and their 95 percent confidence
intervals (the gray lines) for the elasticities of  my,  ym, and  my as the identifying
restrictions ranging from –1 to 2, respectively, as well as the estimated values of 
 my and  ym and their 95 percent confidence ellipses when  ym = 0 is adopted as the
identifying restriction.
The results for CASH give rather limited support to long-run monetary neutrality,
although these are somewhat unstable, with low reliability, compared with the esti-
mation results for M2. In particular, the estimates of  ym are significantly negative 
when  my > 0.30 and when  my >− 0.80. Moreover, the estimates of  ym rise suddenly
when  ym approaches 1.0 and the estimation accuracy declines.
The M1 results include no cases where long-run monetary neutrality is significantly
rejected within the range of the identifying restrictions presented in the figure, and 
generally support long-run monetary neutrality. Moreover, the estimation reliability 
is generally higher than that for CASH, although it does decline somewhat under the
identifying restriction  ym.
D. Estimation Results regarding the Superneutrality of M2
As a final estimation using long-term annual data, Figure 6 and Table 6 present 
the estimation results regarding superneutrality for M2. In this figure and table, the
restricting parameters are changed to   my,  y m,   my, and  y m in order to examine 
the effects of changes in the growth of the money stock, but the setup is otherwise
the same as under Figure 2 and Table 5. 
Figure 6 shows that superneutrality is supported under a very limited range of 
parameters. Specifically, when the identifying restriction is   my or  y m, superneutrality
is not rejected only within the very narrow ranges −0.65 <   my < 0.10 and −0.10 <  y m
< 0.10. When the identifying restriction is   my, superneutrality is rejected just in the
range 0.15 <   my < 2.20, but the standard error is generally large and the estimation
accuracy is low.
The results of the robustness check on the lag order and the prewar dummy 
presented in Table 6 show that when the identifying restriction is   my or  y m, or 
conversely when   my and  y m are estimated using superneutrality ( y m = 0) as the 
identifying restriction, there are many cases that support superneutrality. However,
when  y m is estimated using   myas the identifying restriction, or   myis estimated using
superneutrality as the identifying restriction, the estimation accuracy is low and
superneutrality is rejected in a large number of cases. Also, similar to the neutrality 
test results, the superneutrality estimation accuracy tends to decline as the lag 
order increases.
99
On Long-Run Monetary Neutrality in Japan100 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004























–1.0 –0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0

























–1.0 –0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0






















–1.0 –0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0


















–2.0 –1.5 –1.0 –0.5 0.0 0.5 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0
 ym
 my
[4] 95 Percent Confidence Ellipse for  my and  ym When  ym = 0
Note: Black lines in panels [1]–[3] and “×” in panel [4] are estimated values. Gray lines
indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Note: Black lines in panels [1]–[3] and “×” in panel [4] are estimated values. Gray
lines indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals.VI. Testing Using Quarterly Postwar Data
In this section, we test long-run monetary neutrality by using quarterly data over the
postwar period. By doing so, we confirm the robustness of our results so far using
long-term annual century-long data.
The data used in this section are seasonally adjusted quarterly time-series data
starting from 1955 from the data set as explained in Section III. We use the Bank of
Japan monetary statistics
26 for cash, M1, and M2, and the SNA statistics for real
GDP. The sample period runs over approximately 49 years from 1955/II through
2003/IV, and is seasonally adjusted using X-12-ARIMA.
27
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Table 6  Long-Run Superneutrality of M2: Robustness to Lag Length and 
Sample Period
[1] Estimates of  y m with Various Identifying Restrictions (  my = 0,  y m = 0, and   my = 1) 
Sample Dummy Lag Identifying restriction
period variable order   my = 0  y m = 0   my = 1
1890–2003 — 2 –0.344 (0.246) 0.028 (0.170) –3.061 (1.130)
1890–2003 — 3 –0.321 (0.297) 0.076 (0.242) –2.017 (0.496)
1890–2003 — 4 –0.267 (0.340) 0.170 (0.430) –2.322 (0.709)
1890–2003 PW 2 –0.329 (0.245) 0.033 (0.169) –3.059 (1.146)
1890–2003 PW 3 –0.256 (0.296) 0.085 (0.239) –2.015 (0.503)
1890–2003 PW 4 –0.256 (0.337) 0.170 (0.422) –2.313 (0.720)
[2] Estimates of   my,  y m, and   my with the Identifying Restriction of Long-Run Superneutrality ( y m = 0)
Sample Dummy Lag Identifying restriction:  y m = 0
period variable order   my  y m   my
1890–2003 — 2 0.689 (0.192) –0.411 (0.228) –1.576 (1.096)
1890–2003 — 3 0.664 (0.173) –0.545 (0.336) –0.145 (1.627)
1890–2003 — 4 0.733 (0.186) –0.587 (0.350) –0.105 (1.467)
1890–2003 PW 2 0.607 (0.183) –0.378 (0.226) –1.401 (1.101)
1890–2003 PW 3 0.564 (0.161) –0.488 (0.326) –0.402 (1.607)
1890–2003 PW 4 0.644 (0.174) –0.537 (0.342) –0.101 (1.437)
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are the standard errors.
2. Specifications with a dummy variable (PW) are estimated adding a constant dummy variable
that takes the value of one from 1941 on.
26. Regarding the money stock data, we mainly use the average outstanding data, which are available for most of 
the sample period. However, we use the end-quarter data for periods when the average outstanding data are not
available: 1955–62 for CASH and M1, and 1955–66 for M2. Moreover, from April 1998 the coverage of the
money supply statistics is widened to include foreign banks operating in Japan (new basis), so we adjust for the
differential to make the data continuous. Additionally, from 1979 the M2 data include CDs. 
27. In compiling the seasonally adjusted series for the money stock, we take the following two steps. First, we 
conduct the seasonal adjustments using X-12-ARIMA on three series: the end-quarter data for the old basis, the
average outstanding data for the old basis, and the average outstanding for the new basis. Second, we concatenate
the three series after adjusting for the differentials between them. This is because it is likely that three series have
different properties of seasonal fluctuations, and thus it is deemed necessary to concatenate the three series after
adjusting for seasonal fluctuations. The ARIMA models used for the seasonal adjustments were (2, 1, 1)(2, 1, 2)
for cash, (2, 0, 0)(2, 1, 2) for M1, (2, 1, 2)(1, 1, 0) for M2, and (2, 1, 0)(2, 1, 0) for real GDP, and 
adjustments were made for changes in the number of business days.A. Preliminary Tests
We first conduct unit root tests and cointegration tests between real GDP and the
money stocks to examine the time-series properties of the data. The results of the
unit root tests are presented in Tables 7 and 8, and the results of the cointegration
tests in Tables 9 and 10. In the same approach adopted for the empirical analysis
using the annual data in Section IV, we conduct two sets of unit root and cointegra-
tion tests with or without considering a structural change using the quarterly data.
The results in Tables 7 through 10 for the quarterly data correspond to those in
Tables 1 through 4 for the annual data. 
Summarizing the test results, whether or not a structural change is considered, 
the results indicate that M1 and M2 are I(1), are not cointegrated with real GDP, 
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Table 7  Unit Root Test (Postwar Quarterly Data)
[1] Full Sample (1955/III–2003/IV)
CASH M1 M2 Real GDP
[A] Level
ADF –0.712 (4) –2.626 (9) 0.089 (4) –2.174 (10)
PP –0.045 –2.151 0.321 –0.782
WS 1.211 (4) 0.146 (1) 4.517 (1) 2.069 (12)
[B] First difference
ADF –4.043*** (1) –3.603** (4) –3.341* (8) –3.118 (9)
PP –62.268*** –94.140*** –36.255*** –252.750***
WS –3.790*** (1) –3.767*** (4) –2.949* (8) –2.995* (9)
[C] Second difference
ADF –6.852*** (6) –6.540*** (10) –6.697*** (7) –8.110*** (8)
PP –240.905*** –177.302*** –165.253*** –250.415***
WS –6.892*** (6) –6.358*** (10) –6.806*** (7) –7.998*** (8)
[2] Post-First Oil Crisis Sample (1976/IV–2003/IV)
CASH M1 M2 Real GDP
[A] Level
ADF –2.732 (3) –0.354 (1) –0.715 (8) –0.804 (3)
PP –7.444 0.048 –1.016 –0.752
WS –0.429 (7) –0.336 (1) 2.224 (1) –0.258 (3)
[B] First difference
ADF –3.522** (1) –6.147*** (0) –3.036 (6) –3.978*** (2)
PP –56.145*** –68.553*** –29.012** –120.878***
WS –3.718** (1) –6.277*** (0) –3.221** (6) –4.141*** (2)
[C] Second difference
ADF –5.042*** (6) –5.317*** (10) –4.148*** (7) –4.948*** (8)
PP –122.067*** –93.950*** –106.279*** –131.162***
WS –5.127*** (6) –5.709*** (8) –3.365*** (7) –5.021*** (8)
Notes: 1. Constant and trend terms are included in both ADF and WS tests.
2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
3. Figures in parentheses show the lag order. The lag order is chosen by the general-to-
specific rule: the lag order is iteratively shortened until the last coefficient becomes 
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Table 8  Unit Root Test with a Structural Change (Postwar Quarterly Data)
CASH M1 M2 Real GDP
[A] Level
Model-1 1.020 (2) 1.889 (1) –4.426 (1) –0.882 (2)
[1974/II] [1973/II] [1989/IV] [1972/IV]
Model-2 –5.642*** (2) –3.881 (1) –3.206 (1) –2.983 (2)
[1971/IV] [1970/II] [1970/II] [1967/IV]
[B] First difference
Model-1 –5.524*** (1) –9.212*** (0) –4.919** (0) –6.545*** (2)
[1974/II] [1973/I] [1973/I] [1972/IV]
Model-2 –5.586*** (1) –8.656*** (0) –5.392** (2) –6.554*** (2)
[1974/III] [1988/III] [1972/IV] [1970/I]
[C] Second difference
Model-1 –22.316*** (0) –13.809*** (1) –16.132*** (0) –12.634*** (2)
[1973/I] [1980/III] [1972/III] [1974/I]
Model-2 –22.234*** (0) –14.155*** (1) –16.548*** (0) –12.706*** (2)
[1965/IV] [1963/II] [1989/IV] [1974/I]
Notes: 1. “Model-1” and “Model-2” test the null hypothesis   = 1 by
Model-1: xt =   +  DUt +  t +  D(Tb)t +  xt−1 +  
k
i=1 xt−i + et,
Model-2: xt =   +  DUt +  t +  DTt +  D(Tb)t +  xt−1 +  
k
i=1 xt−i + et,
where t is the time trend and e is the error term.  Here, the value of DUt is zero before the 
structural change and one thereafter; the value of D(Tb) is one in the period after the struc-
tural change and zero at all other times; and the value of DTt is zero before the structural
change, and then becomes the dummy variable t.
2. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively, based
on Perron (1997).
3. Dates inside brackets show the time points when the structural change occurs. These time
points are selected to maximize the logarithm of the t-value of the structural change parameter.
4. Figures in parentheses show the lag order. The lag order is chosen by the general-to-
specific rule: the lag order is iteratively shortened until the last coefficient becomes 
significant within the maximum lag order of 12.
Table 9  Cointegration Test (Postwar Quarterly Data)
CASH M1 M2
Full sample
–2.661   (10) –2.269   (10) –2.847   (10) (1955/IV–2003/IV)
Post-first oil crisis 
–0.700     (0) –2.475     (3) –2.028     (3) (1976/IV–2003/IV)
Notes: 1. We conduct the ADF test on the regression results for real GDP on the constant term and
the money variables (the Engle-Granger test). The table does not include any results that
are significant at the 10 percent level or less.
2. Figures in parentheses show the lag order. The lag order is chosen by the general-to-
specific rule: the lag order is iteratively shortened until the last coefficient becomes 
significant within the maximum lag order of 12.and thus meet the preconditions for testing long-run neutrality. However, when the
beginning of the sample period for M1 is set to 1976/IV, M1 is cointegrated with real
output. Turning to CASH, when a structural change is not considered CASH is I(1)
and is not cointegrated with real GDP, but when a structural change is considered
CASH is likely to be I(0).
Based on the above test results, when quarterly postwar data are used, M2 fully
meets the time-series conditions to test for long-run neutrality, while M1 and CASH
generally meet these testing requirements. 
B. Benchmark Estimation Results
Figure 7 presents the benchmark estimation results for CASH, M1, and M2, respec-
tively, for the sample period from 1957/III to 2003/IV and the lag order of four, and
with a dummy variable (a constant dummy with a value of one) that takes the value
of one after the first oil crisis (from 1973/IV on). Like Figure 2, the first three panels
in Figure 7 show the estimates of  ym (the black lines) and their 95 percent confidence
intervals (the gray lines) when the identifying restrictions for  my,  ym, and  my range
from –1 to 2, respectively. Conversely, the fourth panel adopts long-run monetary
neutrality ( ym = 0) as the identifying restriction and plots the 95 percent confidence
ellipse for the two short-term elasticities  my and  ym. 
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Table 10  Cointegration Test with a Structural Change (Postwar Quarterly Data)
(Sample Period: 1955/III–2003/IV)
CASH M1 M2
[A] Level shift (C)
ADF * –3.237 [1962/III] –2.711 [1973/III] –3.470 [1963/II]
Zt* –2.711 [1964/III] –3.524 [1973/I] –2.572 [1993/III]
Z * –12.066 [1964/III] –22.454 [1973/I] –12.609 [1971/IV]
[B] Level shift and trend break (C/T)
ADF * –2.692 [1989/IV] –2.871 [1990/I] –3.285 [1987/I]
Zt* –1.334 [1993/III] –1.665 [1993/II] –2.313 [1986/III]
Z * –4.812 [1993/II] –6.799 [1993/II] –9.248 [1984/III]
[C] Regime change (C/S)
ADF * –4.033 [1976/I] –4.051 [1976/I] –4.068 [1974/II]
Zt* –3.569 [1973/IV] –3.815 [1973/II] –4.015 [1974/III]
Z * –23.896 [1973/IV] –26.877 [1973/II] –28.958 [1974/III]
Notes: 1. Using the methods presented in Gregory and Hansen (1996), we conduct residual-basis
cointegration tests on level shift (C), level shift with trend break (C/T), and regime change
(C/S), respectively, under the following specifications. The table does not include any results
that are significant at the 10 percent level or less.
(C) x1t =  1 +  2Dt +  x2t + et.
(C/T) x1t =  1 +  2Dt +  t +  x2t + et.
(C/S) x1t =  1 +  2Dt +  1x2t +  1x2tDt + et.
Here, Dt has a value of zero before the structural change, and then becomes the dummy
variable t.
2. Dates inside brackets show the time points when the structural change occurs.106 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004
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[4] 95 Percent Confidence Ellipse for  my and  ym When  ym = 0
Note: Black lines in panels [1]–[3] and “×” in panel [4] are estimated values. Gray lines
indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals.
CASH M1 M2On the whole, the estimation results for CASH, M1, and M2 all generally support
long-run monetary neutrality.
28,29 Looking at the estimation results in the first three
rows, the estimates of  ym are a decreasing function of  my and  my and an increasing
function of  ym, and its 95 percent confidence intervals generally include  ym = 0 
for the identifying restrictions ranging from –1 to 2. However, when  my is used 
as the identification restriction for CASH,  ym for M1, and either  my or  my for 
M2, the standard error increases and the estimation accuracy declines as the value 
of the identification restriction increases. Additionally, looking at the estimation
results in the fourth row, the confidence ellipses all include the origins and all slope
downward to the right. As for M2, however, the range of the confidence ellipse for
 ym is somewhat broad.
It should be noted that the estimation results for the postwar quarterly data show
a wider range of confidence intervals and are weak in testing power compared with
those for the annual century-long data. This suggests that longer observation periods
are more desirable in testing long-run monetary neutrality, since they include more
information on long-run fluctuations.
C. Robustness Check for M2
Table 11 presents the results of the robustness check for the lag order and the sample
period. We see from the table that the estimation results for the full sample with 
the first oil crisis dummy are robust to the selection of the lag order, and support
long-run monetary neutrality. We, however, also see from the table that long-run
monetary neutrality is rejected when the first oil crisis dummy is excluded in the full
sample estimation and when the sample period is shortened after the first oil crisis.
Next, to examine the effects of the recent data observed under zero interest rates,
Figure 8 plots the results for sequentially estimating  ym by extending the end of 
the sample period from 1994/IV using  my = 0,  ym = 0, and  my = 1 as identifying
restrictions. We see from the figure that the point estimates of  ym remain almost
unchanged regardless of the end of the sample period after 1994, and thus generally
support long-run monetary neutrality. Nevertheless, a closer look at the figure shows
that long-run monetary neutrality is just rejected when using  my = 0 as an identifying
restriction when the end of the sample period is set after 2001/III.
107
On Long-Run Monetary Neutrality in Japan
28. We also examine the robustness of the estimation results regarding the lag order and exclusion of the post-first 
oil crisis dummy. When the post-first oil crisis dummy variable is excluded from the full sample estimation, 
long-run monetary neutrality tends to be rejected for all three indicators for the money stock: CASH, M1, and
M2. However, when the beginning of the sample is set at 1976/IV, long-run monetary neutrality is generally
supported, regardless of the lag order.
29. To compare the estimation results in King and Watson (1997) for the U.S. postwar period data, we conduct 
similar estimations by setting the end of the sample period at 1990. The estimation results are almost equivalent
to Figure 7, which are close to the estimation results in the United States. It should, however, be noted that the
test power is weak as evidence in the broadened significant intervals, especially for the case when  my is used as an
identifying restriction.108 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004
Table 11  Long-Run Neutrality of M2 (Postwar Quarterly Data): Robustness to 
Lag Order and Sample Period
[1] Estimates of  ym with Various Identifying Restrictions ( my = 0,  ym = 0, and  my = 1)
Sample period
Dummy Lag  Identifying restriction
variable order  my = 0  ym = 0  my = 1
1957/III–2003/IV — 4 0.429 (0.077) 0.434 (0.254) 0.427 (0.084)
1957/III–2003/IV — 6 0.399 (0.081) 0.396 (0.270) 0.413 (0.083)
1957/III–2003/IV — 8 0.410 (0.088) 0.407 (0.298) 0.427 (0.090)
1957/III–2003/IV PO 4 0.224 (0.112) 0.249 (0.230) 0.037 (0.160)
1957/III–2003/IV PO 6 0.185 (0.105) 0.186 (0.222) 0.088 (0.137)
1957/III–2003/IV PO 8 0.192 (0.105) 0.193 (0.229) 0.092 (0.138)
1976/IV–2003/IV — 4 0.412 (0.084) 0.409 (0.191) 0.403 (0.094)
1976/IV–2003/IV — 6 0.404 (0.093) 0.401 (0.214) 0.395 (0.104)
1976/IV–2003/IV — 8 0.406 (0.082) 0.401 (0.194) 0.404 (0.092)
[2] Estimates of  my,  ym, and  my with the Identifying Restriction of Long-Run Neutrality ( ym = 0)
Sample period
Dummy Lag  Identifying restriction:  ym = 0
variable order  my  ym  my
1957/III–2003/IV — 4 0.950 (0.179) –3.753 (2.128) 2.011 (0.349)
1957/III–2003/IV — 6 0.737 (0.119) –3.230 (2.060) 2.154 (0.396)
1957/III–2003/IV — 8 0.730 (0.119) –3.127 (2.206) 2.117 (0.411)
1957/III–2003/IV PO 4 0.316 (0.055) –1.425 (0.778) 1.164 (0.735)
1957/III–2003/IV PO 6 0.304 (0.051) –1.296 (0.923) 1.583 (0.992)
1957/III–2003/IV PO 8 0.345 (0.057) –1.441 (1.054) 1.669 (1.108)
1976/IV–2003/IV — 4 0.871 (0.195) –3.290 (1.865) 2.031 (0.402)
1976/IV–2003/IV — 6 0.942 (0.229) –3.618 (2.885) 2.069 (0.488)
1976/IV–2003/IV — 8 0.958 (0.213) –3.669 (2.510) 2.124 (0.428)
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are the standard errors.
2. Specifications with a dummy variable (PO) are estimated adding a constant dummy variable
that takes the value of one from 1973/IV on.109
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Figure 8  Long-Run Neutrality of M2 (Postwar Quarterly Data): Robustness to Data of










1994 96 95 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03










1994 96 95 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03










1994 96 95 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03
[3] 95 Percent Confidence Interval for  ym When  my = 1
Notes: 1. Horizontal axis corresponds to the end of the sample period.
2. The “   ” in the figures indicates the estimated value of  ym, and the vertical
line shows the 95 percent confidence interval.VII. Conclusions
In this paper, we have comprehensively investigated long-run monetary neutrality in
Japan in three respects. First, we have compiled two types of data sets for century-long
annual data as well as postwar quarterly data. Second, we have carefully examined the
time-series properties of the data, especially their orders of integration. Third, we have
fully analyzed the robustness of the empirical results against wide-ranging identifying
restrictions in the bivariate structural VAR model of the money stock and real output.
Based on these investigations, we have found robust evidence supporting long-run
monetary neutrality, especially in the case of M2 as a measure of the money stock. In
particular, we have found very solid evidence of long-run monetary neutrality from
long-term time-series data retroactively available from the Meiji Period.
Of course, it is important to note that the estimation results shown in this paper
rely on two relatively strong assumptions. First, the testing framework for long-run
monetary neutrality in Fisher and Seater (1993) depends crucially on the assumption
of the time-series properties of the data series. In light of this point, we pay due con-
sideration to properly account for the time-series properties of the money stock and 
real output by employing the longest time series currently available since the Meiji 
Period. We, however, should be somewhat cautious about the limited power of unit
root testing procedures. The results of the order of integration of the money stock and
real output are still sensitive to the handling of structural breaks, such as the World 
War II period for century-long annual data and the first oil crisis for the postwar 
quarterly data.
Second, the bivariate VAR model of King and Watson (1997) has a limitation that
it is able to identify just two macroeconomic shocks, i.e., monetary and non-monetary
shocks. The testing results on long-run monetary neutrality are not necessarily the 
same if the economy has three or more sources of macroeconomic shocks. Thus, it is
conceivable to extend the analytical framework into a multivariate model that includes
other variables in addition to the money stock and real output.
30 The estimation results
in the paper show that long-run monetary neutrality is supported in both century-long
annual data and postwar quarterly data. Among these, the estimation results show
higher precision when using annual data. This suggests that longer observation 
periods are more desirable in testing long-run monetary neutrality, since they 
include more information on long-run fluctuations. Thus, for the testing based on 
the postwar quarterly data with a shorter period but higher-frequency observations, 
it is deemed worthwhile to consider the extension into a multivariate model with 
three or more variables. 
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30. However, Bullard (1999) surveys recent empirical studies on long-run monetary neutrality across countries, and
points out that the analytical results using multivariate models generally support those found using bivariate models.APPENDIX: OUTLINE OF LUCAS’S MODEL
In this appendix, we explain that even when long-run monetary neutrality actually
holds, empirical analyses using a simple reduced-form model may lead to a false 
conclusion of monetary non-neutrality.
The economy is depicted using a Lucas-type aggregate supply curve and a 
monetarist aggregate demand function. The money stock follows the autoregression
process presented as equation (A.1). 
yt =  (pt − Et−1pt),
pt = mt −  yt, (A.1)
mt =  mt−1 +  t
m.
Here y, m, and p are the logarithms of real output, the money stock, and price level,
respectively. The money stock follows a stationary process (  ≠ 1), and  
m is a shock
to the money stock. Equation (A.1) is structured so that only unexpected changes in
the money stock influence output. Thus, permanent changes in the money stock do
not influence output, and so long-run monetary neutrality holds.
When equation (A.1) is solved for output, we can derive a distributional lag
model for the money stock as presented in equation (A.2). 
  yt = —— —(mt −  mt−1). (A.2)
1 +  
Even though equation (A.1) shows long-run monetary neutrality, the reduced-form
model presented as equation (A.2) suggests that a single-unit permanent increase in
the money supply will result in an output increase of  (1 −  )/(1 +   ) units. In
other words, if a simple reduced-form model is used for testing monetary neutrality,
this may lead to an erroneous conclusion of non-neutrality. When the money stock
has a unit root (when   = 1), however, the results cannot be misread. 
There are actually diverse shocks in the economy, so it is not possible to directly
observe  
m, a pure shock to the money stock. If we also give consideration to the 
existence of other shocks, endogenous policy responses, and other factors, then even if
the money stock has a unit root, it is still inappropriate to use a simple reduced-form
equation to test long-run neutrality, and we need to identify the shock  
m.
111
On Long-Run Monetary Neutrality in JapanAsakura, Kokichi, and Chiaki Nishiyama, eds.Nihon Keizai no Kaheiteki Bunseki:1886–1970 (Monetary
Analysis of the Japanese Economy: 1886–1970), Sobunsha Publishing Co., 1974 (in Japanese).
Backus, David K., and Patrick J. Kehoe, “International Evidence on the Historical Properties of
Business Cycles,” American Economic Review, 82 (4), 1992, pp. 864–888.
Banerjee, Anindya, Robin L. Lumsdaine, and James H. Stock, “Recursive and Sequential Tests of 
the Unit-Root and Trend-Break Hypotheses: Theory and International Evidence,” Journal of
Business & Economic Statistics, 10 (3), 1992, pp. 271–287.
Bank of Japan, “The Role of the Money Stock in Conducting Monetary Policy,”Bank of Japan Quarterly
Bulletin, 11 (2), 2003, pp. 151–202.
Blanchard, Oliver Jean, and Danny Quah, “The Dynamic Effects of Aggregate Demand and Supply
Disturbances,” American Economic Review, 79 (4), 1989, pp. 655–673.
Bullard, James, “Testing Long-Run Monetary Neutrality Propositions: Lessons from the Recent
Research,” Review, 81 (6), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1999, pp. 57–77.
———, and John W. Keating, “The Long-Run Relationship between Inflation and Output in Postwar
Economies,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 36 (3), 1995, pp. 477–496.
Christiano, Laurence J., “Searching for a Break in GNP,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 10 (3),
1992, pp. 237–250.
Coe, Patrick J., and James M. Nason, “The Long-Horizon Regression Approach to Monetary Neutrality:
How Should the Evidence Be Interpreted?” Economic Letters, 78 (3), 2003, pp. 351–356.
Faust, Jon, and Eric M. Leeper, “When Do Long-Run Identifying Restrictions Give Reliable Results?”
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 15 (3), 1997, pp. 345–353.
Fisher, Mark E., and John J. Seater, “Long-Run Neutrality and Superneutrality in an ARIMA
Framework,”American Economic Review, 83 (3), 1993, pp. 402–415.
Fujiki, Hiroshi, “Money Demand near Zero Interest Rate: Evidence from Regional Data,” Monetary
and Economic Studies, 20 (2), Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan,
2002, pp. 25–42.
———, and Kiyoshi Watanabe, “Japanese Demand for M1 and Demand Deposits: Cross-Sectional and
Time-Series Evidence from Japan,” Monetary and Economic Studies, 22 (3), Institute for
Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2004, pp. 47–78 (this issue).
Fujino, Shozaburo, Nihon no Mane Sapurai (The Money Supply of Japan), Keisoshobo, 1994 (in
Japanese).
Gregory, Allan W., and Bruce E. Hansen, “Residual-Based Test for Cointegration in Models with
Regime Shifts,” Journal of Econometrics, 70 (1), 1996, pp. 99–126.
Jefferson, Philip N., “On the Neutrality of Inside and Outside Money,” Economica, 64 (256), 1997, 
pp. 567–586.
King, Robert G., and Mark W. Watson, “The Post-War U.S. Phillips Curve: A Revisionist Econometric
History,”Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 41, 1994, pp. 157–219.
———, and ———, “Testing Long Run Neutrality,”Economic Quarterly, 83 (2), Federal Reserve Bank
of Richmond, 1997, pp. 69–101.
Koustas, Zisimos, and Apostolos Serletis, “On the Fisher Effect,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 44 (1),
1999, pp. 105–130.
Kwiatkowski, Denis, Peter C. B. Phillips, Peter Schmidt, and Yongcheol Shin, “Testing the Null
Hypothesis of Stationarity against the Alternative of a Unit Root,” Journal of Econometrics, 
54 (1–3), 1992, pp. 159–178.
Lee, Junsoo, and Mark Strazicich, “Minimum LM Unit Root Tests with Two Structural Breaks,”
Review of Economics and Statistics, 85 (4), 2003, pp. 1082–1089.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money,” Journal of Economic Theory, 4 (2),
1972, pp. 103–124.
———, “Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Trade-Offs,” American Economic Review,
63 (5), 1973, pp. 326–334.
112 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004
ReferencesMaddala, G. S., and In-Moo Kim, Unit Roots, Cointegration, and Structural Change, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Nakashima, Kiyotaka, and Makoto Saito, “Strong Money Demand and Nominal Rigidity: Evidence
from the Japanese Money Market under the Low Interest Rate Policy,” mimeo, 2002.
Ng, Serena, and Pierre Perron, “Unit Root Tests in ARMA Models with Data-Dependent Methods for
the Selection of the Truncation Lag,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90 (429),
1995, pp. 268–281.
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff, “Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux,”Journal of Political Economy,
103 (2), 1995, pp. 624–660.
Ohkawa, Kazushi, Nobukiyo Takamatsu, and Yuzo Yamamoto,Choki Keizai Tokei: 1. Kokumin Shotoku
(Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of Japan since 1868: 1. National Income), Toyo
Keizai, Inc., 1974 (in Japanese).
Okina, Kunio, “Relationship between Money Stock and Real Output in the Japanese Economy: Survey
on the Empirical Tests of the LSW Proposition,” Monetary and Economic Studies, 4 (1),
Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 1986, pp. 41–77.
Olekalns, Nilss, “Some Further Evidence on the Long-Run Neutrality of Money,” Economic Letters, 
50 (3), 1996, pp. 393–398.
Perron, Pierre, “The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis,” Econometrica,
57 (6), 1989, pp. 1361–1401.
———, “Further Evidence on Breaking Trend Function in Macroeconomic Variables,” Journal of
Econometrics, 80 (2), 1997, pp. 355–385.
Sargent, Thomas J., “A Note on the Accelerationist Controversy,” Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, 3 (3), 1971, pp. 721–725.
———, “Observational Equivalence of Natural and Unnatural Rate Theories of Macroeconomics,”
Journal of Political Economy, 84 (3), 1976, pp. 631–640. 
Serletis, Apostolos, and Zisimos Koustas, “International Evidence on the Neutrality of Money,”Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 30 (1), 1998, pp. 1–25.
———, and ———, “Monetary Aggregation and the Neutrality of Money,”Economic Inquiry, 39 (1),
2001, pp. 124–138.
———, and David Krause, “Empirical Evidence on the Long-Run Neutrality Hypothesis Using Low-
Frequency International Data,” Economic Letters, 50 (3), 1996, pp. 323–327.
Soejima, Yutaka, “A Unit Root Test with Structural Change for Japanese Macroeconomic Variables,”
Monetary and Economic Studies, 13 (1), Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of
Japan, 1995, pp. 53–68.
Tobin, James, “Money and Economic Growth,” Econometrica, 33 (4), 1965, pp. 671–684.
Weber, Axel A., “Testing Long-Run Neutrality: Empirical Evidence for G7 Countries with Special Emphasis
on Germany,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 41, 1994, pp. 67–117.
Yamada, Kazuo, “Nihon ni Okeru Kahei no Choki Churitsusei (Long-Run Monetary Neutrality in
Japan),”Osaka University Economics Journal, 46 (3), 1997, pp. 46–54 (in Japanese).
Zivot, Eric, and Donald W. K. Andrews, “Further Evidence on the Great Crash, the Oil-Price Shock, and
Unit-Root Hypothesis,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 10 (3), 1992, pp. 251–270.
113
On Long-Run Monetary Neutrality in Japan114 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2004